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Abstract
The largest party holds more than half of the seats in every third Finnish local council and, thus, is likely to govern  
alone. It is namely the absolute majority that makes the decisions. In this study, I investigate, if single-party and  
coalition governed municipalities differ in economic outcomes.
Theoretical considerations often rely on so-called common pool problem. Common pool models suggest that  
when there is a governing coalition, all parties want to target some spending to their core constituents, while costs  
are shared equally across all parties. This results in higher spending than in the case that one party would be  
governing. However, also contradictory arguments have been proposed. It has been suggested that, for instance,  
strategic use of debt or role of swing voters in elections could lead to higher spending under single-party  
government.
In this study, I show evidence from Finnish municipalities that is consistent with the idea of common pool models.  
Following the recent development lines in empirical political economics, I exploit close elections as a source of  
exogenous variation using regression discontinuity design (RDD) adjusted to proportional system. It is assumed  
that close elections are as good as if they were random. Estimates suggest that single-party control decreases, on  
average, total expenditures and revenues by around 200 euros per capita. However, it seems that the effect gets  
smaller year by year. It could be that re-electoral incentives affect the behavior of parties that govern councils  
alone. I also analyze the effect in several areas of spending and revenues.
The data set that I use in this study includes data from 445 municipalities for a varying number of years between  
1980–2010, which makes 13,104 observations in total. These data cover results of 3,778 elections.
This study develops a simple though new way of analyzing the research question. I use seat division rules to  
compute the running variable for the regression discontinuity design. Moreover, most previous studies on the topic  
compare outcomes in different countries. In this study, the outcomes are compared within the same system, i.e. all  
units share the same institutional background. Last, the topic has not been studied in the Finnish context before,  
even though single-party control is common phenomenon and municipalities have an important role in the Finnish  
system.
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Tiivistelmä
Suurimmalla puolueella on yli puolet valtuustopaikoista joka kolmannessa Suomen kunnanvaltuustossa. Jos  
puolue saavuttaa enemmistöaseman, se oletettavasti haluaa päättää kaikista asioista yksin. Tässä tutkielmassa  
tarkastelen, eroavatko yhden puolueen ja koalitioiden johtamat kunnat toisistaan taloudellisilta lopputulemiltaan.
Kysymystä on usein tarkasteltu niin kutsutun common pool -ongelman kannalta. Common pool -mallien mukaan  
koalitiohallinnon tapauksessa kaikki siihen kuuluvat puolueet haluavat kohdistaa kulutusta omiin  
kannattajaryhmiinsä. Samanaikaisesti tämän kulutuksen kustannukset jaetaan tasan kaikkien koalition  
jäsenpuolueiden kesken, mikä voi johtaa suurempaan kulutukseen kuin siinä tapauksessa, että yksi puolue  
vastaisi päätöksenteosta. Myös vastakkaisia ajatuksia on esitetty. Esimerkiksi strateginen velanotto tai liikkuvien  
äänestäjien merkitys vaaleissa saattaisivat johtaa korkeampaan kulutukseen, kun yksi puolue tekee päätökset.
Tässä tutkielmassa löydän Suomen kunnista tuloksen, joka on yhtenevät common pool -mallien ajatuksen kanssa.  
Hyödynnän täpäriä vaaleja eksogeenisen variaation lähteenä käyttämällä niin kutsuttua  
regressioepäjatkuvuusmenetelmää (RDD) sovellettuna suhteellisen vaalitavan järjestelmään. Täpärien vaalien  
oletetaan tuottavan tuloksia, jotka ovat yhtä hyviä kuin satunnaistetusta kokeesta saadut. Estimaattien mukaan  
yksipuoluekontrolli laskee kokonaismenoja ja -tuloja keskimäärin 200 eurolla asukasta kohti. Vaikutus näyttäisi  
kuitenkin pienenevän vuosi vuodelta. On mahdollista, että uudelleenvalinnan kannustimet vaikuttavat yksin  
hallitsevien puolueiden käytökseen vaaleja edeltävillä periodeilla. Tutkin yksipuoluekontrollin vaikutusta myös  
useissa kulutuksen ja menojen alaluokissa.
Käyttämäni aineisto sisältää 13104 kunta-vuosi-havaintoparia 445 Suomen kunnasta vuosien 1980–2010 välillä.  
Aineisto kattaa kaikkiaan 3778 vaalien tulokset.
Tarkastelen tutkimuskysymystä yksinkertaisella mutta uudella tavalla hyödyntämällä paikanjakosääntöjä  
regressioepäjatkuvuusmenetelmän käyttämiseksi. Hyödynnän tässä tutkielmassa dataa yksiköistä, joilla on sama  
institutionaalinen tausta, kun taas valtaosa aiemmista samaa kysymystä tarkastelevista tutkimuksista käyttää  
aineistoa esimerkiksi eri maista. Kysymystä ei ole aiemmin tutkittu Suomen kuntien tapauksessa, vaikka  
yksipuoluekontrolli onkin yleinen ilmiö ja kunnilla on toisaalta tärkeä rooli suomalaisessa järjestelmässä.
Avainsanat 
kunnat
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1 Introduction
Decision making power is concentrated on one party in approximately every third out of
336 local councils in Finnish municipalities at the moment, even though there usually is
rich variety of parties participating in the local elections. Concentrated political power
is not only a recent phenomenon. Particularly, the Center Party and the Swedish Party
have held an absolute majority of the council seats in a significant fraction of munici-
palities for decades. This has been an intensively discussed topic. Some have claimed
that absolute majorities even spoil the municipal decision making by implementing self-
ish policies, whereas others have argued that the existence of these majorities is not
a prominent problem, if a problem at all. In any case, it is the absolute majority of
representatives in a local council that has the final mandate to make the decisions.
On the one hand, if one party has the absolute majority, it can basically implement
policies without having to negotiate with other political groups. On the other, if none
of the parties controls over half of the seats, parties will have to form coalitions and
make the decisions together. Does single-party control in a local council have some
sort of eﬀect on public expenditures and the way that are financed? That is, do single-
party and coalition governments diﬀer from each other considering economic outcomes?
These are questions that this study aims to answer.
The standard story in political economics and political science literature is that all par-
ties in the government want to target some spending to their core constituents in order
to get re-elected. The costs of these policies are divided equally between all parties in
the government. This might lead to situation, in which coalition government spends,
taxes and possibly accumulates higher debt than a single party absolute majority gov-
ernment would. This view has its roots in so called common pool problem. Weingast
et al. (1981) were the first to propose a pork barrel model with multiple local groups
or political actors, who can independently decide how much they spend. Benefits from
this spending are local, but it is financed from a common pool of global tax revenues.
Their idea idea has been applied in comparing governments with diﬀerent compositions.
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Similar thoughts have been presented by, for example, Persson et al. (2007). Their the-
oretical model suggests that electoral competition inside coalition governments causes
higher spending than under single party governments.
My empirical results using data from Finnish municipalities are mainly in line with the
predictions of common pool models. I show that municipalities governed by a single
party spend less than those governed by coalitions during first three years. Estimates
that I obtain suggest that, on average, single-party control decreases total expenditures
and revenues by around 200 euros per capita. I argue that this diﬀerence between coali-
tion and single-party governed municipalities results from the common pool problem.
However, it seems that there are no diﬀerences during election years. One possibility
is that single-party governments change their behavior during election years and spend
more in order to get re-elected. This sort of behavior is suggested by, e.g., Khemani
and Wane (2008). I also analyze spending and revenues in diﬀerent areas. Spending
in several areas follows the same pattern as total expenditures, but the eﬀect on tax
revenues and deficits is not that clear. Furthermore, I find some evidence that single-
party control has negative eﬀect on total debt, supporting so-called “weak government
hypothesis” first discussed by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b). They propose that
more fragmented governments, i.e. governments formed by larger coalitions, tend to
borrow more.
I use data from 445 currently existing Finnish municipalities between years 1980 and
2010. These data have been collected from Altika data base of Statistics Finland. Al-
together, the data set contains 13,104 municipality-year observations. I exploit close
elections as a source of exogenous variation using quasi-experimental regression discon-
tinuity design. Close election outcomes are considered to be as good as if they were
random. The idea behind regression discontinuity is not complex. A party has full
control of decision making once it gains over half of the seats. If the seat share is less
than half, there is a of coalition of parties that makes the decisions. In RDD, identifica-
tion of the causal eﬀect is based on comparing cases, in which the largest party almost
won the majority of seats to those in which the largest party almost lost its majority
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position. These units should have on average similar characteristics with the exception
that only those above the threshold value receive the treatment. Thus, all diﬀerences
in outcomes should come entirely from the treatment. This diﬀerence or “discontinuity
gap” can be interpreted as an average treatment eﬀect across all political units (Lee
and Lemieux 2010). I run several robustness checks and validity tests to show that the
results I obtain in this study are reliable.
The results that I obtain are in line with most previous empirical studies on the topic,
which provide results consistent with the idea of common pool models. For instance,
Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) argue that the number of parties is related to higher
spending, and Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) conclude that the more there are parties
in a government, the more will be spent as share of GDP in the next year. Perotti
and Kontopoulos (2002) and Schaltegger and Feld (2009) find that larger coalition sizes
are related to larger government budgets. Persson et al. (2007) find that single-party
governments spend less than coalition governments. However, Freier and Odendahl
(2012a) have obtained recently deviating results using a method that is related though
distinct to regression discontinuity designs. They run simulations to define close election
outcomes and find that single-party governed municipalities in German state of Bavaria
would spend more and collect higher property taxes. Also, they find some evidence of
higher total debt in these municipalities.
The empirical part of this thesis provides somewhat novel analysis in three ways. First,
most previous empirical studies diﬀer from this one in the sense that they compare
multiple democratic countries with diﬀerent kinds of electoral systems. Some of these
countries have two-party system, whereas some have more parties. This study compares
diﬀerent units, namely single-party and coalition governed municipalities, within the
same electoral system and with the same institutional background. Second, similar
regression discontinuity approach has not been used previously to analyze this question.
And third, there are no studies on the topic using Finnish data.
Considering the important economic role of municipalities in Finland, it seems to be
an intresting question, who governs them. For instance, municipal spending as share
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of GDP is around 18 % and municipalities employ roughly 20 % of the total Finnish
workforce. Municipalities have a wide range of responsibilities, including social and
health care, primary education, childcare, town planning, civil engineering etc. and
many municipalities also provide some services voluntarily, such as cultural services
and secondary education. Most of the financing comes from fiscal grants and municipal
taxes (see, e.g., Moisio et al. 2010).
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Section 2 reviews related theoretical and em-
pirical literature. Section 3 introduces the institutional background. Section 4 outlines
the empirical strategy, and Section 5 describes the data that I use in this study. Results
and their interpretation can be found from Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Review of Previous Literature
The idea of purely altruistic politicians, who maximize the welfare of all citizens, was
abandoned by public choice theorists some decades ago. In many political economy
models, spending, taxation and debt are usually considered as instruments that politi-
cians use to aﬀect voters’ voting decisions. For instance, political business cycle models
predict that politicians manipulate diﬀerent economic variables during pre-electoral
terms in order to be re-elected (e.g., Rogoﬀ 1990). Some of the literature discusses
economic policies as a way of attracting swing voters (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1995,
1996). Special interest politics and targeted spending are common topics, too (e.g.,
Persson 1998).1
What does the economic theory suggest about government composition and spending,
i.e. are there diﬀerences between coalitions and single-party governments? Political
economy theories related to these questions often have their foundations in so called
common pool problem. Benefits of some policy are local or aﬀect only a certain part
of population, but financing is global and taken from a common pool of wealth. For
1 Besley (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide broad overviews of political economy
models.
2 Review of Previous Literature 5
example, Weingast et al. (1981) present a pork barrel model with multiple local groups
or political actors that can independently decide how much they spend. These groups
finance their spending from a common pool of global tax revenues. As the political
actors are seeking re-election, the costs and benefits for their own constituents are more
important than those of other groups. Weingast et al. show that this kind of behavior
leads to overspending in Nash equilibrium.
The common pool problem leads to a common statement in the literature. It is often
argued that coalition governments spend more than single-party governments.2 The
explanation for this claim is that all parties in the government want to target some
spending to their core constituents to ensure re-election. The costs of these policies
are divided between all parties in the government. This might lead to higher aggregate
spending than under single-party control. On the other hand, if spending is aﬀected,
also revenues must be adapted. That is, the government should collect higher tax
revenues or accumulate more debt.
In a more recent contribution, Persson et al. (2007) suggest a model of electoral common
pool problem in coalitions of parties.3 They build their model on the basis proposed by
Weingast et al. (1981), but their analysis is more elaborated. Their theoretical model
predicts that electoral competition inside coalition governments causes higher spend-
ing than under single party governments. The basic idea is the following. Diﬀerent
parties in the government decide independently, how much to spend on public good
consumed by their core constituents, and this spending is financed from a common
pool of taxes. The electoral rule, i.e. whether there is a majoritarian or a proportional
electoral system, aﬀects government spending indirectly. Consistent with Duverger’s
2 I emphasize that there are not separate government and opposition in Finnish municipal councils.
In the context of Finnish local councils, “government” is parallel to the party with absolute majority
or parties that have formed a coalition holding over half of the seats and “opposition” to the parties
that hold less than half of the seats and, hence, do not have very large an eﬀect in decision making.
All parties, both in “opposition” and “government”, are members of the council.
3 There are also many other common pool models, albeit they usually consider common pool
problem with multiple geographical areas. Each area has political representatives, who want to target
as much spending as possible to their own area. As in common pool models generally, this spending
is financed from a common pool of revenues. See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley and
Coate (2003).
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law, a well-known rule in political science, Persson et al. assume that proportional
elections lead to more fragmented party system and, thus, coalition governments are
more common than in majoritarian elections. Furthermore, they argue that there are
diﬀerences in magnitudes of spending in diﬀerent types of electoral systems. Duverger’s
law predicts that in majoritarian electoral system favors two-partyism, whereas in pro-
portional electoral systems there are typically more than two parties participating in
the decision making process (see Duverger 1954). In a multi-party system, such as in
Finland, both coalition and single-party governments are possible.
Although the common pool explanation for government composition and spending dif-
ferences is quite widely agreed, also contradictory views have been proposed. Freier and
Odendahl (2012a) suggest two alternative conceptual frameworks to rethink the topic
and to supplement their empirical analysis of single-party governed municipalities in
German state of Bavaria. The first framework is based on indivisibilities of spending,
the second on strategic use of debt. First, Freier and Odendahl argue that indivisibil-
ities of spending lead to higher spending under single-party governments than under
coalition governments. The agenda setter, who has to oﬀer all coalition members at
least their reservation utility, will have to oﬀer other coalition members their preferred
project, because taxation without their preferred project would be lower than their
reservation utility. Thus, the agenda setter has to choose whether to implement all
coalition members’ projects or none. It could be the case that none of the projects
is implemented, depending on the valuation of them. But, if there is a single-party
government, it would have to choose between implementing her preferred project or
not. Freier and Odendahl reason that this might lead to larger spending than under a
coalition government, if some assumptions about the value of the project are satisfied.
The second idea of Freier and Odendahl (2012a) is related to so-called strategic use of
debt. The strategic use of debt has its roots in the work of Persson and Svensson (1989)
and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), especially the latter of which is relevant considering
the setting of Freier and Odendahl’s study.4 In the strategic debt model of Alesina and
4 Persson and Svensson (1989) propose a model, in which a conservative government that expects to
be replaced in the next election may borrow more and set lower taxes to tie the hands of her follower.
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Tabellini, there are two parties that diﬀer in their preferences for two diﬀerent public
goods. When the probability of re-election is small for one party, it will overspend
on its preferred public good. This spending is financed by taking higher debt, which
furthermore ties the hands of the successor government. Alesina and Tabellini show
that the equilibrium debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between the
parties and the less likely the re-election of incumbent government is. In Freier and
Odendahl’s setting, the ideas of Alesina and Tabellini are applied as follows. If there is a
close election and some party has barely won the majority of seats, it might expect that
the probability of losing the next election is considerably high. It starts maximizing its
constituents’ utility by overspending to its preferred public goods.
What Freier and Odendahl (2012a) do not take into account, but could aﬀect incumbent
politicians’ behavior, is swing voters’ role in elections. The presence of swing voters
might aﬀect in diﬀerent ways in cases of single-party government and coalition covern-
ment. When certain assumptions on sizes of political groups are satisfied, it could be
the case that a single-party government has to attract more swing voters in order to get
re-elected. For example, in a model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), swing voters
ultimately determine the election outcomes. It is possible that the government has to
use spending as an instrument for attracting swing voters on its side, as suggested by
Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996).
Khemani and Wane (2008) capture such phenomena in their political economy model of
populist fiscal policy. In their model, a single-party government tends to spend more and
tax more than a government formed by a coalition of multiple parties. The government
in power either implements policies that maximize the utility of her constituents or
guarantee re-election. In the latter case, the government provides more public good to
receive more swing voters’ votes, which she needs in order to stay in power. Khemani
and Wane show that single-party governments spend more in aggregate and collect
greater tax revenues than coalition governments, when certain reasonable assumptions
on group sizes are satisfied.
Most of the empirical work supports the traditional view based on the common pool
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problem. Some older studies, such as Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b), use a sim-
ple OLS approach and find that the number of parties is related to higher spending.
These results, however, should not be interpreted as causal eﬀects of government com-
position on spending. Number of parties in a government is likely to be endogenous
for two reasons. Unmeasured voter preferences could lead to omitted variable bias in
the regression, or there could be bias caused by simultaneous causality, if underlying
economic conditions have engendered a government with some particular composition.
Hence, Roubini and Sachs report rather correlations than causal relationships.
Some newer studies try do deal with endogeneity problems by using diﬀerent panel
data methods. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) use country-level data from 17 European
countries they find that the more there are parties in a government, the more there
is public spending as share of GDP. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find using data
from OECD countries that the number of parties in the government might not be
as important factor of spending as the number of ministers in the cabinet is. Still,
larger coalition sizes are related to larger government budgets according to Perotti and
Kontopoulos. Similar results are proposed by Schaltegger and Feld (2009), who use
data from Swiss Cantons. Persson et al. (2007) attempt to overcome endogeneity prob-
lems with instrumental variable approach. They motivate their choice of instruments,
electoral rules, by proposing a theoretical model, which I already described previously.
Using a data set of around 50 countries, they conclude that coalition governments tend
to spend more than single-party governments.
Most of previously mentioned studies diﬀer from this one in the sense that they com-
pare multiple democratic countries with diﬀerent kind of electoral systems. Some of
these countries have two-party system, whereas some have more. This study compares
diﬀerent units within the same electoral system, namely single-party and coalition gov-
erned municipalities in a multi-party system with proportional elections. This is the
case also in the study by Freier and Odendahl (2012a), who find support for their con-
ceptual framework from German municipalities in the state of Bavaria. Their results
suggest that single-party governed municipalities tend to spend more per capita than
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municipalities that are governed by coalitions. They also find that single-party control
has positive eﬀect on property tax revenues and total debt. Freier and Odendahl’s use
a method that is closely related to regression discontinuity designs. However, their
approach deviates from the traditional regression discontinuity setting in the sense that
instead of using treatment that is a deterministic function of some underlying variable,
they run computer simulations to define close election outcomes.5 In empirical political
economics, close elections are considered to be as good as if they were random. Thus,
they can be exploited to identify the causal eﬀect of single-party control on economic
outcomes.
The predictions of common pool theories are approached from a slightly diﬀerent point
of view by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). He uses RDD approach with population tresholds
defining the size of municipal council to study, does larger government lead to higher
level of spending in Finnish local governments. He concludes that the larger the size
of the legislature, the smaller is the size of government. This result is contradictory to
the argument that larger governments spend more than smaller ones, which is based on
the common pool problem. Pettersson-Lidbom suggests that the reason could be that
more legislators can control budget maximizing bureaucracy better.6,7
To conclude, both theoretical and empirical evidence is mixed, but the traditional state-
ment about coalitions spending more than single-party governments dominates discus-
sion. This proposition is based on the idea of common pool problem (e.g., Weingast et
5 This simulation method for defining close election outcomes was first proposed by Freier and
Odendahl (2012b). In short, the idea is to perturbate election results with a random variable and then
redivide the seats. If seat shares change often enough, then the election is considered close. However,
the magnitude of perturbation is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, as is drawn the line between close and
unclose elections.
6 The idea of budget maximizing bureaurcrats comes from Niskanen (1971).
7 Finnish municipalities have been analyzed from political economy perspective in few other studies.
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2012) study voluntary mergers of Finnish municipalities and conclude that
mergers are in line with voter preferences. Hyytinen et al. (2012) study, how re-election incentives
aﬀect politicians’ voting decisions on municipal mergers. They find that the more the merger enhances
politician’s re-election prospects, the more likely he is to vote for it. Dahlberg and Mörk (2008)
show that municipal elections have had a positive eﬀect on the number of local employees in Finnish
municipalities, i.e. there is some evidence of political business cycle in the number of local employees.
Moisio (2002) investigates, how municipalities’ expenditures are aﬀected by diﬀerent political parties.
He concludes that the seat share of the leading (or largest) party in local council does not aﬀect
expenditures much.
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al. 1981). Most of previous empirical work supports this view. However, recent find-
ings of Freier and Odendahl (2012a) suggest the opposite, i.e. single-party governments
spend actually more than coalitions. Freier and Odendahl motivate their suggestions
with strategic use of debt and indivisibilities of spending. Also, the role of swing voters
in elections might result in the behavior that Freier and Odendahl observe.
3 Institutional Background
Municipalities have a very important role in the Finnish system. It is stated in the
Finnish constitution that they are self-governing units. The economic importance of
them can be characterized by the facts that municipality spending as share of GDP is
around 18 % and municipalities employ roughly 20 % of the total Finnish workforce.
On average, they decide of budgets of about 5,000 euros per capita annually. In this
section, I describe the responsiblities of Finnish municipalities and decision making in
them. For a much broader review on Finnish municipalities, I refer to Moisio et al.
(2010).
Municipalities have a wide range of responsibilities, which are stated in the Municipal
Act8. These statutory responsibilities include social and health care, primary educa-
tion, childcare, town planning, civil engineering (for example, maintaining roads, waste
management, water management) etc. Many municipalities also provide some services
voluntarily, such as cultural services or secondary education.9 In 2010, health and
welfare services formed the largest share of expenditures, almost half of it, in Finnish
municipalities.10 About one fifth of the expenditures came from education and culture,
and share of investment expenditures was around 10 %. Personnel expenditures formed
8 Kuntalaki in Finnish.
9 Some services are provided by joint authorities that are formed by two or more municipalities.
They operate under municipal legislation, as do the municipalities, but they do not have the right
to collect taxes. They are financed from the member municipalities’ budgets. Joint authorities are
mainly responsible for tasks that require a larger population base than a small municipality would
have alone. For example, arranging health services jointly is very common. In 2010, there were 226
joint authorities. See, e.g., Moisio et al. (2010) for further details.
10 Figures on the municipal economy represented in this section come from Oﬃcial Statistics of
Finland. I present the latest figures available while writing this section.
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about 50 % of all spending. Average expenditure shares in Finnish municipalities in
year 2010 are shown in Figure 1.
To cover these expenditures, Finnish municipalities are allowed to collect taxes and
out-of-pocket payments from the users of municipal services. In addition, municipalities
receive a share from corporate taxes and grants from the central government. Accord-
ing to the Municipal Act, municipalities should have balanced budgets. In practice,
however, Finnish municipalities can borrow money without any restrictions or punish-
ments for overspending set by the central government.11 In 2010, slightly under 40 %
of municipalities’ revenue came from municipal income tax, 2.5 % from property taxes
and 4 % from share of corporate taxes. Municipalities can independently decide their
tax rates. In recent years, municipal tax rates have varied between 16–21 %. Approxi-
mately one fifth of the revenues came from fiscal grants that municipalities receive from
the central government in 2010. The grant system is very complicated. The sizes of
fiscal grants vary a lot and they are aﬀected by many diﬀerent characteristics of munic-
ipalities, such as location, population structure and tax revenues collected. About one
fourth of the revenues were operational revenues, such as out-of-pocket payments from
users of municipal services. Average shares of revenue sources in Finnish municipalities
in year 2010 are shown in Figure 2.
11 In recent discussions, politicians have suggested the possibility of setting boundaries for municipal
debt. Municipalities’ debt has been increasing rapidly, which has raised some concerns. Politicians have
argued that borrowing is maybe even too easy and cheap for municipalities, which might have caused
overborrowing. Moreover, use of soft budget constraint might be present, as government bailouts
overdebted municipalities by giving them discretionary fiscal grants. Kornai et al. (2003) approach soft
budget constraints from theoretical point of view, and Petterson-Lidbom (2010) develops an empirical
test.
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Figure 1: Average Expenditure Shares in Finnish Municipalities in 2010.
Figure 2: Average Shares of Revenue Sources in Finnish Municipalities
in 2010.
The number of municipalities in Finland has been decreasing after the Second World
War. This is due to voluntary municipal mergers.12 The first larger wave of munici-
pal mergers was experienced just after the war, the second in the late 1960s and early
1970s, and the on-going one started in the beginning of 2000s. Currently, there are 336
municipalities. To illustrate the decreasing trend of the number of municipalities: there
were 452 municipalities in 2000 and 602 in 1940.13 The majority of Finnish municipal-
ities have relatively small population, though due to municipal mergers some smaller
12 For a list of municipal mergers in Finland, see Kuntaliitto (2012).
13 The central government has seen municipal mergers as one possible way to deal with problems
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municipalities have disappeared from the Finnish map. On average, municipalities had
a population of around 16,000 in 2011, and the median was slightly below 6,000. At
the present, the smallest municipality (Suomenniemi) on Mainland Finland has popula-
tion of about 760 people, whereas the largest municipality (Helsinki) has approximately
590,000 inhabitants. Finland also has an autonomous region called Åland where there
are even smaller municipalities. However, municipalities located on Åland island are
omitted from this study due to the special characteristics of the region.
Decision making in Finnish municipalities is lead by local councils, the duties of which
are defined in the Municipal Act. According to the Municipal Act, “the local council is
responsible for operation and economy of the municipality”. Hence, one of the respon-
sibilities of a local council is to approve municipality’s budget, i.e. decide how much to
spend on and how to finance this spending. The council appoints a municipal executive
board. Its role is to prepare decision making. The council can also set up committees
to deal with diﬀerent functions, for example, social and health services, education or
urban planning. As executive boards, the committees usually have a preparatory role
in the decision making process. Despite the board and the committees, the local council
always makes the final decisions. Decisions are taken by simple majority of the council
members. The members of executive boards and committees are generally speaking
local politicians but not necessarily members of the council, and the composition of
them is based on the seat shares in the local council. This is a fundamental diﬀerence
compared to majoritan systems, such as the system in the United States. Even though
some party would hold an absolute majority of seats, it does not have a total control
over all decisive organs.
Municipal councils are chosen in municipal elections, which are organized according to
Municipal Act and Electoral Act14. A new municipal council is elected every fourth year
(e.g. 1976, 1980, 1984 etc.), on the fourth Sunday of October. Council’s term starts at
caused by ageing population and domestic migration. Especially in smaller municipalities, ageing and
migration decrease the tax revenues and may increase the need of costly social and health services. To
speed up municipal mergers, the central government has given monetary grants to municipalities that
have merged. Also, some requirements on minimum population base for provision of certain public
services have been set. E.g., Moisio et al. (2010) discuss municipal mergers in Finland more closely.
14 Vaalilaki in Finnish.
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the beginning of the next calendar year and ends at the end of the next election year.
The election system is proportional representation, which is an open and unordered
list system. That is, a voter votes an individual candidate and not directly a party.
Similar municipal elections are held, for instance, in Germany. In elections held during
the period from 1976 to 2008, the voter turnout has varied between 60–80 %. Seats in
the municipal council are shared using d’Hondt method. The size of council depends
on the population. The relationship between the population and the number of seats
is described in Table 1.
Population Seats in municipal council
 2, 000 13, 15 or 17
2, 001  4, 000 21
4, 001  8, 000 27
8, 001  15, 000 35
15, 001  30, 000 45
30, 001  60, 000 51
60, 001  120, 000 59
120, 001  250, 000 67
250, 001  400, 000 75
  400, 001 85
Note: If there are less than 2000 people living in a
municipality, it may freely choose between having 13, 15 or
17 seats in the municipal council. Source: Kuntalaki
1375/2007, 10 §.
Table 1: Number of Seats in Municipal Council.
In d’Hondt method, a comparative index is calculated for each candidate and the can-
didates are arranged according to their indices, after which the seats are shared. Com-
parative indices are calculated so that the candidate, who receives most votes among
the candidates of his party, gets a comparative index that equals total votes of the
party. The candidate with second most votes gets a comparative index that equals half
times total votes of his party, the candidate with third most gets total votes divided by
three etc. If two candidates in the same party receive the same amount of votes, there
is a lottery between them. Furthermore, if two candidates from two diﬀerent parties
have the same comparative index, their order in the final list is drawn. Parties are also
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allowed to form electoral alliances. If there is an electoral alliance between two parties,
they are treated as if they were one party, when the seats are shared.15
Political parties that are in the party register and other groups that have collected
enough supporters are allowed to set candidates in elections. Municipal elections have
been dominated by the three large parties from political left, center and right: the Social
Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party. The Center Party
has traditionally held the largest share of the seats even if it has not received largest
share of votes. Other parties that hold seats in municipal councils include the Left
Alliance, the Green Party, the Finns, the Swedish Party and the Christian Democrats.
Many municipalities also have local, often independent or one-agenda political groups
that are not registered parties but hold seats in local councils. In single-party governed
municipalities, it is usually the Center Party that has the absolute majority. The
hegemony of the Center Party at local level is partly due to its past as an agrarian
party. Also, the Swedish Party holds absolute majority of seats in notable number of
municipalities, especially in the coastal Finland where the majority of Finnish Swedish
population lives.16
4 Empirical Strategy
There are several challenges in estimating the causal eﬀect of single-party control on
economic outcomes, as parties are not randomly selected to govern in municipalities.
First, measuring voter preferences might be hard. Existence of unmeasured voter pref-
erences might lead to omitted variable bias. If this is the case, correlation between
single-party control and economic outcomes is not necessarily a sign of a causal rela-
tionship between the variables. Another possibility is that underlying conditions have
lead in single-party control in Finnish municipalities. In this case, there could be bias
15 Both ideological and technical alliances occur. Sometimes, two or more parties that share similar
thoughts form an alliance. Or it could be the case that parties become allies just to enhance their
position in the electoral competition, as the electoral system favors larger parties.
16 For example, Wiberg (2006) provides an overview of the Finnish political system (in Finnish).
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caused by simultaneous causality. These are situations, in which endogeneity occurs,
i.e. error term is correlated with explanatory variables.
One way to deal with the endogeneity is quasi-experimental regression discontinuity
design. The method was first proposed by psychologists Thistlethwaite and Camp-
bell (1960) for the evaluation of scholarship programs of universities. However, it was
not until the late 1990s that the method became popular among economists.17 Lee and
Lemieux (2010) provide an extensive overview of regression discontinuity designs in eco-
nomics. Their paper also includes comprehensive list of previous studies in many fields
of economics using RDD.18 First ones to apply the method in political economics include
Petterson-Lidbom (2008) and Lee et al. (2004).19 Petterson-Lidbom investigates the
eﬀect of party control on economic outcomes using data from Swedish municipalities.
He divides parties in two blocs, socialist and non-socialist, and uses RDD to compare
the economic outcomes in municipalities governed by diﬀerent blocs. He concludes
that there are notable diﬀerences between municipalities governed by diﬀerent political
blocs. Lee et al. study the impact of electoral strenght on politicians’ voting decisions
in U.S. elections, i.e. do shifts in voter’s preferences aﬀect incumbent party’s behavior.
They conclude that voters do not elect policies, but the incumbent implements partisan
policies.
Both Petterson-Lidbom (2008) and Lee et al. (2004) use close elections as a source
of exogenous variation, as close elections are considered to be as good as if they were
random. They point out the simple fact that party control changes discontinuously
at 50 % vote share threshold. Identification in their regression discontinuity designs is
based on using units that are just below and just above this treshold, i.e., close election
outcomes. On average, these units have similar characteristics with the exception that
only those above the treshold value of 50 % vote share receive the treatment. Thus, all
diﬀerences in outcomes should come entirely from the treatment. This “discontinuity
17 Some well-known examples from first studies using RDD in economics literature include Angrist
and Lavy (1999), Black (1999), van der Klaauw (2002) and DiNardo and Lee (2004).
18 For a text book treatment of regression discontinuity designs, see the standard reference Angrist
and Pischke (2009).
19 The first working paper versions of these studies were Petterson-Lidbom (2001) and Lee et al.
(2002).
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gap” between the units on both sides of the discontinuity threshold can be interpreted
as an average treatment eﬀect across all political units (Lee and Lemieux 2010).20
In the spirit of the recent empirical political economics literature, I use quasi-experimental
regression discontinuity design to analyze, if single-party controlled municipalities are
diﬀerent to those governed by coalitions in terms of economic outcomes. In (sharp)
regression discontinuity design, treatment status is a deterministic function of some
underlying variable,
Di = 1 (xi   x) , (1)
where x is a known treshold or cutoﬀ and 1 (·) is indicator function that gets value 1,
if some unit receives treatment and value 0, if not. In the literature, the variable xi is
referred as “assignment”, “forcing” or “running” variable. Treatment is a discontinuous
function of xi, i.e. no matter how close to x xi is, treatment is unchanged until xi   x.
All units with xi   x belong to the treatment group, and units with xi < x belong to
the control group. The basic idea of RDD is to compare outcomes for units that are
close to the threshold, that is, the underlying targeting variable is just below or just
above the cutoﬀ point x. On average, these units should have similar characteristics
with the exception that only those above the cutoﬀ point receive the treatment (Lee
and Lemieux 2010).
How to choose the assignment variable? The convention in RDD studies in political
economics has been to use 50 % vote share as cutoﬀ point, when investigating the
causal eﬀect of party control on economic outcomes. However, using vote-share-based
threshold is inadequate in a proportional election system, such as in Finland, as the
control over more than half of the seats can be obtained with less than 50 % of votes.21
20 Since Petterson-Lidbom (2008) and Lee et al. (2004), RDD has been used to analyze political
partisanship and politician’s voting behavior in many studies. For example, Gerber and Hopkins (2011)
study eﬀects of mayoral partisanship in U.S. cities, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) analyze partisan
politics in U.S. local councils and Leigh (2007) measures the impact of gubernatorial partisanship on
policy outcomes in U.S. states. Recently, also alternative methods to study party eﬀects have been
proposed. See, for instance, Folke (2011) and Freier and Odendahl (2012b).
21 In the data set used in this study, the lowest vote share that gave some party over 50 % of the seats
was 45.2 %. What is probably not surprising, vote share and seat share are still strongly correlated.
Their correlation is about 0.97.
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Petterson-Lidbom (2008) suggests using seat shares instead of vote shares in his study
on party-eﬀects on economic outcomes in Swedish municipalities. Swedish municipal-
ities have proportional local elections, too. Petterson-Lidbom’s idea seems intuitively
reasonable, as if one party gains more than half of the seats, it will most likely choose
to govern alone. On the other hand, if none of the parties gains absolute majority,
i.e. maximum seat share is below 50 % threshold value, a governing coalition will be
formed. Even though using seat shares is probably a better idea than using vote shares,
this approach involves problems. One issue is that seat share is very discrete, which
makes comparing outcomes within very narrow bands impossible. See Lee and Card
(2008) for further discussion. It is concerning that in my data, there are no observations
very close to the 50 % threshold in seat shares. The election data that I use includes
around 300 observations with maximum seat share within interval [48, 52], but none
within the interval (49, 51). For these reasons, I compute the running variable in an
alternative way. To be precise, the new running variable is also discrete, but it should
anyway work out better than seat share does.
Let us consider a municipality where the council has n seats. First, I find ((n +
1)/2)th comparative index among the parties participating in the election using d’Hondt
method.22 Let c denote this comparative index. Now, the largest party must obviously
obtain more than c(n + 1)/2 votes in order to get an absolute majority, i.e. (n + 1)/2
seats. Note that c(n+1)/2 is not necessarily an integer. Hence, I take the ceil function
from it, ie. round it up to the closest integer. Let this number of votes be vˆ. If the
total number of votes in the municipality is V and the actual number of votes that the
largest party received is v, then the value of the running variable s is given by
s =
v   vˆ
V
. (2)
If s is negative, the largest party would have to gain more votes in order to obtain the
absolute majority, and if s is non-negative, the largest party could lose votes and still
receive the absolute majority. That is, when s   0, we know that the largest party
22 Recall that the number of seats is always odd, hence term (n+ 1)/2.
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has the absolute majority. Otherwise, no party holds an absolute majority share of the
seats and parties will form some sort of coalition that governs. The treatment in the
regression discontinuity setting is now given by
Di = 1 (si   0) . (3)
Units close to this threshold depict close election outcomes, which furthermore are
assumed to be as good as if they were random. In sharp regression discontinuity frame-
work, the treatment eﬀect is formally given by (see, e.g., Imbens and Lemieux 2008)
lim
s!0 
E[Yi|si = s]  lim
s!0+
E[Yi|si = s]. (4)
There are a couple of important caveats related to this approach. First, note that in
this setting, additional votes of the largest party do not come from or go to any smaller
parties. Thus, this running variable does not necessarily measure the minimal vote
change to receive or lose the absolute majority, which is the idea in RDD studies that
use vote share as running variable. I stress that my running variable characterizes only
the required vote change such that the largest party loses or gains an absolute majority
when the votes of other parties remain unchanged. Therefore, it does not depict the
actual closeness of elections particularly well for observations that are far from the
cutoﬀ point, even though it should work pretty well in the vicinity of treatment. As
the treatment eﬀect is identified using observations close to the cutoﬀ, this should not
be too big a problem.
Second potential problem is that I do not have information about electoral alliances
between parties, which could aﬀect these calculations. It is possible that either smaller
parties have electoral alliances, which could prevent the largest party from obtaining
the absolute majority position, or it might be that the largest party has an electoral
alliance with some smaller party, which could give it the majority status more easily.
Fortunately, alliances are rare in municipal elections. Still, there are 41 observations
in the election results with running variable s   0, while the actual seat share is less
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than 50 %. Moreover, there are five cases, in which the algorithm does not assign
the largest party the absolute majority, even though it actually obtains more than
half of the seats. The only possible reason for this are electoral alliances. Moreover,
this causes some fuzziness in the design, as not all units right to the cutoﬀ point are
treated. That is, the probability of treatment does not change sharply from zero to one
at the threshold. See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of the
probability of treatment.
This approach has also some advantages. It is related to the solution that Folke (2011)
suggests, but it is simpler to implement. Key diﬀerence between my and Folke’s ap-
proach is that Folke fixes the total amount of votes and then computes the minimal
vote change required to change seat division. I assume that the required votes come
from people who did not vote. My approach diﬀers from Folke’s also in the sense that
Sainte-Laguë method is used to distribute the seats in Swedish municipal elections,
whereas d’Hondt method is used in Finland. Another advantage is that my approach
does not involve inaccuracy related to arbitrary choice of closeness parameters for com-
puter simulations like in Freier and Odendahl’s (2012a, 2012b) method. Also, it allows
the graphical analysis that is considered to be an important, complementary part of
RDD studies.23
A regression discontinuity design can basically be implemented in a number of ways,
but essentially we choose either parametric or nonparametric approach. Nonparamet-
ric is preferred in this study, but I also report the results from parametric estimations.
Consider first the following regression function characterizing the simplest case of para-
metric RDD,
Yit =  Dit + f(sit) + uit, (5)
where Yit is the economic outcome in municipality i in year t, Dit is treatment dummy
defined as in equation (3), f(sit) is some smooth function (often a low-order polynomial)
23 Another related approach is introduced by Kotakorpi et al. (2012). They develop a "bootstrap"
approach for identifying close winners and losers based on resampling votes from actual data to in-
vestigate returns to holding oﬃce. Similar method could be applied also in the framework of this
study.
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from assignment variable sit and uit is error term.   is the parameter of interest. If the
regression discontinuity design is correctly implemented, especially, if f(·) is correctly
specified,   should indicate the causal eﬀect of the treatment Dit on the economic
outcome Yit. Note that we can estimate the control function separately for both sides
of the threshold.
In parametric approach, whole range of data is exploited to fit a low order polynomial to
the observations. This could be a more eﬀective design, when there is limited number
of observations available especially close to the cutoﬀ. In many recent applications,
the estimations are carried out nonparametrically using local linear regression. For
instance, Hahn et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive representation of implementing
RDD using local linear regression. Practical issues are also discussed by Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). In short, the idea is to identify the
treatment eﬀect using data within band of width h around the cutoﬀ point. Identifying
the treatment eﬀect in some closer environment of the cutoﬀ is reasonable given the
concerns about possible misspecification of the running variable further away from the
threshold point. Also, there should be decent amount of observations in the vicinity of
the threshold point, which is necessary for the nonparametric approach. For instance,
there are almost 1,000 observations with running variable s 2 [ 0.1, 0.1] and half of
that within interval [ 0.05, 0.05] for election years.
Several diﬀerent ways of choosing h for the local linear regression have been proposed.
I follow Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) suggestion and choose h such that criterion
h⇤ = argminMSE(h) is satisfied. Imbens and Kalyanaraman discuss the techicalities
in detail. Henceforth, optimal bandwidth means bandwidth that is chosen following
Imbens and Kalyaraman’s routine. I report results using the optimal bandwidth as
well as several other bandwidths.
In addition to choice of this bandwidth, local linear regressions involve choice of kernel.
I estimate local linear regressions using triangular kernel, which in practice means that
observations closer to the cutoﬀ point are given larger weight than those further away.
This weight decreases linearly from 1 to 0, when moving distance h away from the
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cutoﬀ (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Lee and Lemieux point out that it has been shown
in the literature that triangular kernel is optimal for local lineas regressions, but still,
they recommend using rectangular kernel, as local linear regressions using rectangular
kernels should be simpler to implement than those using triangular kernels. Yet, Lee
and Lemieux notify that the choice of kernel does not really matter that much and
diﬀerent kernel choices usually yield in very similar estimates.24
I carry out the design also as a fuzzy RDD in order to deal with the blemish that lacking
information on electoral alliances causes in the computation of the running variable.
Results from this supplementary analysis are included in the Appendix. In the fuzzy
RDD, we exploit the discontinuity in the probability of treatment conditional on the
running variable and use this discontinuity as an instrumental variable. The probability
of treatment does not change sharply from zero to one at the threshold, i.e.
lim
s!0 
P[Mi = 1|si = s] 6= lim
s!0+
P[Mi = 1|si = s], (6)
where Mi is dummy for the largest party actually controlling over half of the seats.
Formally, the treatment eﬀect is given by (see, e.g., Imbens and Lemieux 2008)
lims!0  E[Yi|si = s]  lims!0+ E[Yi|si = s]
lims!0  E[Mi|si = s]  lims!0+ E[Mi|si = s] . (7)
In the first stage of the fuzzy RDD, we estimate Dit as a function of Mit and the
control function f(sit). The second stage is identical to (5), but Dit is instrumented.
More detailed discussion is provided by, e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009).
5 Description of Data
In this study, I exploit data on Finnish local governments. All data on economy,
population and elections were obtained from Altika database of Statistics Finland and
24 This is the case in this study, too. I have conducted the estimations also using rectangular kernel,
but the estimates remain essentially the same as when using triangular kernel. These results, though,
are not reported.
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Oﬃcial Statistics of Finland database.25 I observe eight municipal elections between
years 1980 and 2008 and use data from eight electoral terms during the period from
1980 to 2010. I pool together the data for each year of electoral term and analyze each
year separately. I omit municipalities located on Åland island from the data set, as it
is an autonomous part of Finland with a system distinct from the mainland.
The data set includes data from 445 municipalities for varying number of years due to
municipal mergers, which makes 13,104 municipality-year observations in total. Most
of the municipal economy data are observed for the whole time period, except property
tax and total debt, which are observed only beginning from 1993. There are 7,481
observations of property tax and total debt.
Election result data include votes, vote shares, seats and seat shares for each party
that has participated in the election. In total, the data set contains results from 3,778
votings starting from year 1976. One party has received more than 50 % of the council
seats in 1,363 votings. The Center Party has won the absolute majority of seats in
1,126 municipal elections and the Swedish Party in 206 elections. In the rest of the
cases, this winner has been either the Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party or
some local political group.
The data set contains data on municipal economy for years between 1980 and 2010 as
follows. First, it includes data on total spending, spending on social and healthcare,
education and culture expenditures, personnel expenditures and investments. Second,
revenue data are included: total revenues (which consists of tax revenues, operational
revenues and fiscal grants from the central government), total tax revenues (including
municipal income tax, property tax, share of corporate tax and other taxes), municipal
income tax and property tax. In addition, I observe the size of budget deficit for the
accounting year and total debt. There are small restrictions in the data availability due
to municipal mergers. For some municipalities, the economy data have been combined
even before they amalgamated. I drop out these cases.
25 The availability of data in Altika data base is restricted, though some of the newer data are
publicly available in StatFin data base of Statistics Finland.
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of variables related to municipal economy for
whole sample. The same statistics reported separately for municipalities with and
without an absolute majority party can be found from Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Finnish municipalities report their economy statistics mostly in a similar way, though
there are some deviations that should be mentioned. One reason for this are joint
authorities. For example, some municipalities organize health care services together
with some other municipalities, and some municipalities organize everything on their
own. The way how these municipalities enter their expenditures and revenues in their
accounts can deviate. This can be seen also in Table 2 as a wide range of values for
some of the variables. Furthermore, there have been actuarial changes over the time,
which could raise some comparability issues.
Whole sample
Variable Mean Std. deviation Min Max
Total expenditures 5,020 1,050 1,891 11,105
Social and health care expenditures 2,294 806.56 225.46 7,306
Education expenditures 1,234 358.95 313.01 3,734
Personnel expenditures 2,144 645.01 553.33 5,195
Investments 585.66 424.87 4.24 5,639
Total revenues 4,944 1,208 1,690 12,173
Total tax revenues 2,294 571.32 958.51 7,040
Municipal income tax 2,071 448.29 115.29 6,044
Property tax 133.97 103.67 3.38 1,735
Total debt 1,375 910.70 -435.73 9,701
Deficit (accounting period) 40.14 274.38 -1,906 5,427
Total population 11,818 32,591 178 588,549
Council size 28.62 10.77 13 85
Maximum seat share 47.85 14.74 19.60 100.00
Notes: All expenditure and revenue data are per capita and expressed in 2010 euros. They have
been deflated using price index for municipal expenditures from Statistics Finland. N = 13, 104 for
all expenditure data and for all revenue data except property taxes and total debt, N = 7, 481 for
property tax and total debt and N = 3, 778 for election results.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.
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6 Results
6.1 Graphical Analysis
Following the suggestions of Lee and Lemieux (2010), I start my RDD analysis with
the conventional graphics of the benchmark polynomial specification. Figure 4 presents
total expenditures and Figure 5 total revenues per capita as function of the running
variable s in each year of electoral term. Also, graphs depicting the averages during
terms that are fully covered in the data are included. Each graph depicts a fourth order
parametric fit, which is chosen according to AIC. Furthermore, each observation point
depicts average expenditures or revenues per capita within 0.02 intervals in the running
variable s and dashed lines mark 5 % confidence intervals. Note that in order to make
the graphics more informative, I have restricted the horizontal axis between -0.5 and
0.5, even though the running variable actually takes values up to 1.
Figures 4 and 5 propose some interesting results about the eﬀect of single-party control
on spending and revenues. I analyze the eﬀect separately for each year of electoral term.
Graphs characterizing first, second and third year suggest eﬀect that is consistent with
the predictions of common pool models. That is, when some party has control over the
decision making alone, less is spent and smaller revenues are collected. We see in these
graphs that there is a discontinuous jump downwards at the threshold point s = 0 in
both total expenditures and total revenues. The magnitude of this jump is roughly
200–300 euros per capita for both total expenditures and total revenues, though we
can see from the graphs with confidence intervals that this eﬀect is not statistically
significant at 5 % risk level. It seems that this eﬀect gets smaller year by year.
What appears to be happening in the last year of term, when municipal elections
are held, is interesting. Basically, we do not observe any sort of jump at the threshold,
which would indicate that single-party governed municipalities do not diﬀer from others
in terms of total spending and revenues. Could it be that re-electoral concerns aﬀect
the decision making of those local councils, in which the largest party barely won the
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previous election? For instance, Khemani and Wane (2008) and Freier and Odendahl
(2012a) suggest that this sort of behavior would occur. This could bring the spending
and revenues to the same level as they are in coalition-governed municipalities. However,
the graphics do not tell everything. The next section provides more elaborated analysis.
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Notes: Each figure presents parametric (fourth order) fit of total expenditures per capita as
function of the running variable s. Dashed lines mark 5 % confidence intervals and each
observation point depicts average total expenditures per capita within 0.02 intervals in s.
Figure 4: RDD Graphics for Total Expenditures.
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Notes: Each figure presents parametric (fourth order) fit of total revenues per capita as
function of the running variable s. Dashed lines mark 5 % confidence intervals and each
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Figure 5: RDD Graphics for Total Revenues.
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6.2 Estimated Eﬀect on Spending and Revenues
Before running the regression discontinuity estimations, I estimate naïve OLS model
Yit =  Dit + uit. (8)
These simple estimations suggest that higher spending and higher revenues would be
related to single-party control. See Table A.2 in the Appendix for the OLS results.
But, the reliability of OLS estimates is questionable for two reasons. First, existence
of unmeasured voter preferences might lead to omitted variable bias. And second,
underlying conditions might have lead to single-party control in Finnish municipalities,
which would indicate simultaneous causality. OLS estimates suggest rather that there
is positive correlation between spending and revenue numbers and single-party control.
Results from a regression discontinuity design, on the other hand, are causal results,
when the design is correctly implemented.
Next, I estimate the eﬀect of single party control on each economic outcome in regres-
sion discontinuity setting. I conduct the estimations using local linear regression with
triangular kernel and optimally chosen bandwidth. I report here the regression results
also using bandwidths of half and twice the optimal.26 As discussed earlier, identifying
the causal eﬀect within a narrow band around the cutoﬀ is reasonable, because the
running variable does not necessarily depict the closeness of elections well further away
from the threshold point. However, I have also conducted parametric RDD, the results
of which are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. The results from RDD analysis
using nonparametric methods are repoted in this section. Table 4 presents estimates on
overall spending and total revenues using data from each year of electoral term and the
averages at the end of the term. I compute the averages using data from municipalities,
for which the data set covers the whole term.
The results confirm, what the RDD graphics in previous section proposed and, hence,
26 I do not report optimal bandwidths in this section in order to keep the tables readable. However,
they can be found for total expenditures and total revenues in Figures 6 and 7. Also, Table A.3. in
the Appendix reports optimal bandwidths for all estimations in this section.
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support the claim that the eﬀect of single-party control on total expenditures and
total revenues is negative. The estimates using data from three first years of electoral
term are consistently negative. They vary between around 30–330 euros depending on
year and bandwidth used, but taking into account the errors, they all fit within the
same ballpark. On average, these estimates suggest a decrease of 200 euros in total
expenditures per capita as a result of single-party control. This corresponds about
4% of average spending in Finnish municipalities. Furthermore, the estimated eﬀect
on total revenues has range over 40–310 euros, the average being about 180 euros.
This is also around 4% of average total revenues collected in Finnish municipalities.
Aggregating the data for three first years of electoral terms by taking averages and
conducting similar RDD analysis yields in essentially same results. Note that results
using band of 2h⇤ are consistently smaller in absolute terms than estimates obtained
using narrower bandwidths and they do not show any statistical significance. This is
not that concerning, as band of 2h⇤ is already quite wide. More important is that the
results using narrower bands lie within the same boundaries, given that they should be
more precise.
It is hard to draw any clear conclusions from estimates using data from electoral years.
However, it seems that the estimates are notably smaller in absolute terms than those
that I obtain using data from other years of electoral term. For smaller bandwidths
the eﬀect appears to be negative, but when the bandwidth is increased, the estimates
turn positive. However, none of the estimates shows any statistical significance. I make
a careful interpretation that single-party control has zero or at least not very large an
eﬀect on spending and revenue collecting in electoral years. This interpretation seems
reasonable also given the RDD graphics in Figures 4 and 5.
I also estimate the eﬀect on annual averages during electoral term using data from
entirely covered electoral terms in the data set, ie. data from years between 1981–
2008 and municipalities that have not merged in the middle of the term. These results
confirm that, on average, the single-party governed municipalities spend less annually.
Why do single-party governed and coalition governed municipalities diﬀer during first
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three years of electoral term, and why is the eﬀect not that clear during the election
years? The common pool explanation fits arguably well to the results of first three
years of electoral term. What happens during the election years, then? For instance, the
model of electoral common pool problem by Persson et al. (2007) suggests that common
pool problem results from re-election pursuing behavior of parties in the governing
coalition. Hence, it is hard to believe that common pool behavior would not occur
during the election years. Rather than coalitions changing their behavior, it could be
that single-party governments behave diﬀerently, as proposed by Freier and Odendahl
(2012a) and Khemani and Wane (2008). However, Freier and Odendahl’s conceptual
framework does not fit here particularly well. A more decent explanation would be
that after a very close win, the largest party attempts to guarantee its success in the
upcoming election by spending. It is possible, though more elaborated analysis would
be needed to confirm this, that this sort of behavior and common pool problem occur
at the same time such that there are no observable diﬀerences between single-party and
coalition governed municipalities.
Variable
Year Total expenditures Total revenues
1st
-313.77* -269.46** -74.16 -306.51* -225.15* -84.24
(169.67) (120.46) (91.09) (179.36) (126.46) (95.75)
2nd
-319.87 -276.59* -84.15 -296.29* -217.93* -81.76
(202.00) (137.19) (98.64) (185.41) (135.72) (103.28)
3rd
-324.90* -200.87* -27.00 -239.54* -159.38 -35.49
(176.06) (115.72) (84.48) (142.84) (109.63) (87.04)
4th
-103.30 -26.78 103.21 -10.88 55.35 98.59
(169.89) (117.46) (91.42) (126.66) (96.16) (83.74)
Avg
-335.01** -236.23** -65.30 -254.88* -174.30* -63.00
(167.74) (110.91) (83.72) (148.37) (109.72) (85.54)
Band 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤ 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤
Notes: Results obtained using optimal bandwidth and twice and half of it are reported.
Optimal bandwidths can be found from Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses. Number of observations in
each case: 3, 347 (1st year), 3, 340 (2nd year), 2, 995 (3rd year), 3, 422 (4th year), 2, 991
(averages). Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 % and *** 1 %.
Table 4: RDD Results for Total Expenditures and Revenues.
6 Results 32
I continue my analysis by investigating, if the eﬀect of single-party control can be seen
in specific areas of expenditures or revenues. These results are reported in Tables 5 and
6. Estimates are mainly in line with previous results. The estimated eﬀect follows the
same pattern in multiple areas of expenditures: social and health care, education and
culture, personnel and investments. However, the estimates are mainly insignificant.
There are neither large nor clear diﬀerences in taxation or deficits and, moreover, the
estimates are not statistically significant.
Clearer eﬀect can be seen in total amount of debt, though the estimates show mainly
either no statistical significance or only at 10% risk level. The results suggest that
single-party governed municipalities borrow less, the estimated eﬀect being about  200
euros per capita. This estimate is robust also to narrower bandwidths than half of the
optimal. The eﬀect of single-party control on total debt is smaller during election years,
but still negative. This finding is related to suggestions of Roubini and Sachs (1989a,
1989b), who were first to show that more fragmented governments have larger debts.
This statement is sometimes referred as the “weak government hypothesis”. Later, the
topic has been analyzed in several studies, also using local level data. For instance,
Ashworth et al. (2005) find some support using data from Flemish municipalities.
They also provide an extensive list of previous studies investigating this question.
To conclude, my findings from RDD analysis are in line with most previous empirical
evidence (e.g., Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006, Persson et al. 2007 and Schaltegger and
Feld 2009) as well as with the theoretical considerations building on the common pool
problem (e.g., Weingast et al. 1981 and Persson et al. 2007). That is, single-party
governed municipalities spend less and collect lower revenues per capita than those
governed by coalitions. However, this sort of behavior seems to occur only during the
first three years of electoral term. The results using data from election years suggest
that there are no systematical diﬀerences between single-party and coalition governed
municipalities. It is possible that the councils led by one party change their behavior
during election years due to re-electoral incentives, but more elaborated analysis would
be needed to confirm this.
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Parametric estimations yield in very similar estimates as nonparametric estimations.
Results from parametric RDD are reported for total expenditures and revenues in Table
A.4 in the Appendix. In the parametric RDD, I use fourth order control polynomial
chosen according to AIC. The results are robust to increasing or decreasing the degree,
though these estimates are not reported. Moreover, results from fuzzy design for total
expenditures and revenues are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. Fuzzy regression
discontinuity design provides also similar estimates, though they are consistently larger
in absolute terms than those that I obtain in the sharp design. However, given the
errors, all results fit within same boundaries.
I have also conducted the design as suggested by Freier and Odendahl (2012a). That
is, I perturbate election results and then recompute the seat shares. I then determine
the close elections and use them to identify the eﬀect on outcomes. The results using
this approach are rather inconclusive and they depend greatly on the magnitude of the
perturbation. See Freier and Odendahl’s paper for a closed depiction of the process.
In addition, I have adapted Petterson-Lidbom’s (2008) approach by using seat shares
as running variable and 50% seat share as threshold point. This specification suggests
consistently that single-party control would have zero-eﬀect on expenditures and rev-
enues. Results from these alternative approaches are not reported in this study, but
they are available upon request.
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6.3 Robustness and Validity of Results
In this section, I conduct robustness checks using total expenditures and revenues as
outcomes, as the results concerning them are in greater interest. I also investigate the
validity of the regression discontinuity design. In some recent contributions randomness
of close election outcomes has been questioned, which raises concerns and makes validity
tests even more important, as the whole identification strategy is based on the idea that
close elections would be random. For instance, Grimmer et al. (2011) and Snyder et al.
(2011) propose theoretical models that predict systematic diﬀerences between winners
and losers even in very close elections. Grimmer el al. use data from all U.S. House
elections and show that candidates with structural advantages (i.e. candidates from the
party that controls state oﬃces etc.) are more likely to win in close elections. Caughney
and Sekhon (2010) also find diﬀerences between winners and losers in close elections.
They point out that winners in close U.S. House elections receive more campaign finance
and spend more on campagins. Existing literature presents multiple ways to examine
the validity of results. For example, Lee and Lemieux (2010) provide a summary of
possible validity checks.
I begin the robustness analysis by evaluating the robustness of estimates to diﬀerent
bandwidths. Figures 6 and 7 present the estimated eﬀect on total expenditures and total
revenues in diﬀerent years of electoral terms using several bandwidths, 10 200% of the
optimal bandwidth. The graphics tell the standard story about the tradeoﬀ between
precision and bias, as the confidence intervals become smaller, when the bandwidth is
increased.
We can see from these graphics that there is some variation in the results, but still,
the estimates fit always within the same intervals. Increasing the band, however, yields
in zero-results. Given that the optimal windows are already quite wide, this is not
that concerning. More important is that results using narrower bands remain in the
same ballparks. This robustness check supports the finding that single-party governed
municipalities spend less and collect less revenues during the first three years of electoral
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term. The results using data from election years remain also the same. That is, single-
party control has very little or no eﬀect on total expenditures and revenues. Given that
the sign of the estimated eﬀect varies much for the eﬀect on total expenditures, it is still
hard to make any strict conclusions. The fourth graph in Figure 7 suggests that the
eﬀect on total revenues could be positive during the election years, albeit this eﬀect is
relatively small and statistically not significant. The graphs depicting averages during
the electoral terms confirm that the estimated eﬀect of single-party control on average
spending and revenues is negative.
Next, I set restrictions to the sample and study, how this aﬀects the results. In each
case, I report results using optimally chosen bandwidth and half and twice of it. First,
I look at the treatment eﬀect only using data from municipalities, in which the largest
party is the Center Party, which has had a hegemonial standing in Finnish local councils.
This does not seem to change the estimates particularly much. As I mentioned before,
my election data do not include information on electoral alliances. Therefore, there
are some cases, in which the largest party is not or is assigned the majority, even
though it did or did not actually gain full control over the decision making. Dropping
out these observations does not aﬀect the estimates for first three years greatly, but
the estimates for election year are consistently positive. However, the estimates do not
diﬀer significantly from zero. Last, I rule out outliers in total expenditures and revenues
per capita by restricting the sample to observations above the first percentile and below
the 99th percentile. Again, the results remain the same.
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Notes: Each figure presents estimated eﬀect using several diﬀerent bandwidths. Dashed lines show 5 %
confidence intervals computed using municipality-clustered standard errors. Horizontal lines mark the
optimal bandwidth using Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) method.
Figure 6: Estimated Effect on Total Expenditures Using Different
Bandwidths.
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Notes: Each figure presents estimated eﬀect using several diﬀerent bandwidths. Dashed lines show 5 %
confidence intervals computed using municipality-clustered standard errors. Horizontal lines mark the
optimal bandwidth using Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) method.
Figure 7: Estimated Effect on Total Revenues Using Different
Bandwidths.
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Variable
Year Sample Total expenditures Total revenues
1st
Only Center Party majorities
-309.30* -226.95** -97.42 -207.95 -170.94 -32.12
(166.08) (115.53) (87.09) (166.51) (121.50) (96.73)
No false seat divisions
-227.42 -168.16 -4.60 -286.00 -196.50 -56.04
(186.56) (131.89) (98.19) (195.03) (136.15) (102.74)
No outliers
-287.78* -313.48*** -138.35* -359.78** -259.70** -123.67
(151.80) (106.33) (80.70) (157.54) (112.84) (85.21)
2nd
Only Center Party majorities
-319.93* -239.53* -84.54 -287.46 -240.79 -108.55
(190.78) (129.55) (94.84) (207.32) (154.17) (115.53)
No false seat divisions
-208.93 -174.50 9.46 -238.67 -160.92 -18.87
(211.98) (144.92) (103.61) (195.27) (139.65) (106.79)
No outliers
-304.05* -298.01*** -133.23 -346.99** -267.93** -120.53
(181.21) (125.61) (94.17) (156.86) (117.91) (89.23)
3rd
Only Center Party majorities
-333.29* -202.19 -68.39 -271.96 -236.08 -131.23
(192.14) (123.43) (85.58) (200.47) (144.97) (110.00)
No false seat divisions
-226.51 -129.78 30.31 -219.82 -132.59 -18.62
(182.97) (121.89) (87.69) (155.85) (120.84) (94.23)
No outliers
-253.26 -163.51 0.00 -256.99* -157.24 -35.72
(171.31) (110.21) (82.31) (134.23) (99.57) (80.43)
4th
Only Center Party majorities
-160.57 -61.36 36.15 -78.32 -30.48 32.75
(202.88) (135.59) (100.37) (193.32) (132.25) (99.15)
No false seat divisions
6.73 99.57 148.27* 34.91 76.21 157.74*
(152.50) (110.98) (89.00) (122.87) (95.23) (89.60)
No outliers
-191.27 -98.26 37.02 -83.12 -6.28 56.31
(164.29) (114.90) (88.10) (134.67) (100.81) (81.72)
Avg
Only Center Party majorities
-384.09* -257.96* -153.11 -244.69 -232.87 -148.70
(217.66) (135.88) (93.29) (205.22) (144.23) (110.73)
No false seat divisions
-252.68 -163.06 9.32 -221.31 -119.44 -11.05
(162.16) (112.48) (85.41) (142.42) (109.78) (88.20)
No outliers
-340.36** -233.30** -53.91 -230.75* -114.49 -12.15
(160.56) (108.44) (81.16) (127.36) (97.30) (80.64)
Bandwidth 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤ 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤
Notes: Results using optimally chosen bandwidth and half and twice of it are reported. These optimal bandwidths are not
reported, but they lie in the same ballpark as bandwidths listed in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors clustered at
municipality level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 % and *** 1 %.
Table 9: RDD Results Using Restricted Samples.
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To argue that the eﬀect that we observe origins from single-party control, i.e. it is not
eﬀect of Center Party control, I have conducted the following test. I define new fake
treatment as an interaction of the actual treatment dummy and dummy for Center
Party majority. If the eﬀect emerges from Center Party control, then it is likely that we
observe similar jump also when using the fake treatment. This test can be implemented
using the parametric approach. As before, I conduct the parametric RD estimations
using fourth order control polynomial from the running variable. For example, when
using mean expenditures and revenues at the end of term for completely covered terms
as outcomes, the regressions suggest that there would be a jump of around 200 euros
in expenditures and a jump of around 100 euros in revenues upwards, not downwards.
Moreover, these numbers are not statistically significant. Similar results apply also
when using using data from each year separately. This finding makes it more credible
that the observed eﬀect, indeed, results from single-party control.
I will next check that observed covariates are in balance at both sides of the threshold
point s = 0. For the regression discontinuity design, it is crucial that municipalities
close to cutoﬀ point in seat share are not systematically diﬀerent. That is, at least most
of the covariates must be continuously related to the running variable s, although there
could be random chance that some variables diﬀer for the two groups. Otherwise, the
regression discontinuity design might be invalid, as units close to the threshold are not
fully comparable with each other. I test for discontinuities in several covariates, namely
year, total population, operating margin (diﬀerence between total revenues and total
expenditures), number of seats in the local council, seat share of the Center Party and
seat share of the Swedish Party.27
Table 10 reports the results of the covariate balance test using average values at the end
of the electoral term. I use data from terms that are covered completely in the data set.
Similar results apply also, if the test is carried out separately for each year. Estimates
are mainly statistically insignificant, which supports the validity of the design, but there
is a larger jump in total population. This jump is very significant, when using optimally
27 I have chosen these parties because of their popularity in Finnish municipalities.
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chosen bandwidth. It seems that single-party governed municipalities are considerably
smaller than coalition governed municipalities at the boundary.
One concerning point is that the size of municipality aﬀects the number of seats in local
council. We can see corresponding jump downwards also in the number of seats. It is
often argued in the spirit of common pool problem that when the number of decision
makers increases, also spending increases. Could it be that the jump that we observe
is partly due to this? Not according to previous evidence. Petterson-Lidbom (2012)
shows that spending does not increase in Finnish municipalities, when the council size
increases. Instead, he finds that it decreases.
When the band is made narrower, the estimates start limiting zero and they also lose
their statistical significance. For instance, results using bands of 10 40% of the optimal
do not suggest any concerning jumps in population at the threshold. If the municipal-
ities really diﬀer in population around the cutoﬀ, then controlling for these diﬀerences
could reduce bias that is present. Controlling for population in the regressions yields
in basically same estimates, which of course should be the case, if close elections really
are random.
In general, there are no large diﬀerences between single-party and coalition governed
municipalities around the cutoﬀ. Hence, the covariate balance test supports the validity
of the design.
The second validity test that I conduct is testing discontinuities at other points than
the believed discontinuity point. In these points, the eﬀect should be zero. Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) suggest testing for jumps at the median point of the running variable
at both sides of the cutoﬀ point. These points are now s =  0.18 and s = 0.17. Table
11 presents the regression for total expenditures and revenues results using these fake
cutoﬀs and average numbers from terms that are covered completely in the data set.
I report results using optimal bandwidth and half and twice of it. We do not observe
systematically significant jumps at the fake cutoﬀs and the estimates are very unrobust
to diﬀerent bandwidths. Hence, this validity test does not raise any concerns. Again,
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similar results apply also, when the analysis is conducted separately for all years of
electoral term.
In nonparametric approach, I exclude additional covariates from the estimations. How-
ever, I have conducted parametric regressions both with and without control variables
as reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. Inclusion of covariates can also be considered
a validity test. As it is assumed that close elections are almost as good as if they were
random, including additional controls in the regressions should not aﬀect the magnitude
of the estimates greatly. We see that including controls to the regressions aﬀects the
estimates slightly, but still, all estimates fit within the same intervals.
Last, I carry out a density test suggested by McCrary (2008) to investigate, if individuals
are capable of manipulating the assignment variable. This should not happen, if we
want the RDD to be plausible. McCrary argues that this can be tested by examining,
if there is observable discontinuity in the density of the running variable at the cutoﬀ
point. If there is, then there is reason to believe that individuals might be capable of
manipulating the running variable. It is highly unlikely that electoral fraud occurs in
Finnish municipal elections, but manipulation can still happen, for instance, through
electoral alliances. It could be that the largest party forms electoral alliances with some
smaller parties in order to raise the probability of gaining over half of the seats. If there
is no great jump in the density of the running variable at the cutoﬀ point, McCrary
test supports validity of the design. Figure 6 below presents the distribution of the
assignment variable as histogram and Figure 7 presents estimated density function
with 5 % confidence intervals. As we can see, there is not any peculiar jump in the
histogram or the density of the running variable at the cutoﬀ. This also supports the
validity of the design.
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Band
Variable 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤
Year
-0.86 -0.49 0.34
(1.15) (0.88) (0.73)
Total population
-1343.45 -1514.35*** -78.32
(967.96) (582.72) (600.71)
Operating margin
-89.84 -9.41 68.30
(129.11) (90.23) (65.39)
Number of seats
-1.82 -1.73* -0.15
(1.41) (0.90) (0.71)
Seat share of the Center Party
2.16 0.52 1.45
(1.70) (1.50) (1.46)
Seat share of the Swedish Party
0.10 0.59 -0.60
(1.79) (1.42) (1.40)
Notes: Results using optimally chosen bandwidth and half and twice of it are
reported. Standard errors clustered at municipality level are reported in
parentheses. N = 2, 991. Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 % and *** 1 %.
Table 10: Covariate Balance Test.
Variable
Cutoﬀ Total expenditures Total revenues
-0.18
-206.25 -99.83 -66.76 -183.91 -71.51 25.60
(163.12) (119.71) (99.41) (157.89) (113.82) (93.55)
0.17
312.04** 19.73 61.29 188.43 -2.51 76.77
(157.90) (115.63) (98.55) (180.22) (124.29) (103.05)
Band 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤ 0.5h⇤ h⇤ 2h⇤
Notes: Results using optimally chosen bandwidth and half and twice of it are
reported. These optimal bandwidths are not reported, but they lie in the same
ballpark as bandwidths listed in Table A.3 in the Appendix. Standard errors
clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses. N = 2, 991. Significance
levels: * 10 %, ** 5 % and *** 1 %.
Table 11: RDD Results Using Fake Cutoffs.
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Figure 7: McCrary Test.
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7 Conclusions
This thesis analyses the eﬀect of single-party control on economic outcomes in Finnish
municipalities. Single-party governments are quite common in Finland, as the largest
party holds more than half of the seats in every third Finnish local council. In theoret-
ical sense, the question of this study has its roots in so-called common pool problem.
Common pool models (e.g., Weigast et al. 1981 and Persson et al. 2007) predict that
when there is a governing coalition, all parties want to target some spending to their
core constituents, while costs are shared equally across all parties. This results in higher
spending.
The empirical results that I obtain in this study support the predictions of common
pool models. On average, the results using data from first three years of electoral term
suggest that single-party control decreases total expenditures and revenues by around
200 euros per capita. However, the results using data from election years propose that
there are no clear diﬀerences between coalition and single-party governed municipali-
ties. It could be that single-party governments change their behavior due to re-electoral
concerns, but more elaborated analysis would be needed to confirm this. I also analyze
the eﬀect in several areas of spending and revenues. The estimates for diﬀerent expen-
ditures follow the same patterns as the estimates for total expenditures, though they
are mainly not statistically significant. Results concerning the eﬀect on tax revenues
and deficits are not that clear, but I find some evidence that the eﬀect of single-party
control on debt is negative. This finding supports the weak government hypothesis first
discussed by Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b).
I exploit close elections as a source of exogenous variation using regression discontinuity
design approach. I use data from 445 municipalities for a varying number of years be-
tween 1980–2010, which makes 13,104 observations in total. These data cover results of
3,778 votings. In general, the results are robust to diﬀerent bandwidths and restrictions
in the sample. In addition, I run several validity checks that do not suggest that the
regression discontinuity design is invalid.
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The results that I obtain in this study are in line with previous empirical findings,
but the analysis has also new aspects in four ways. First, my findings suggest that
local politicians do not necessarily behave in the same way during the whole term,
as no large diﬀerences between coalition and single-party governed municipalities are
observed during the election years, whereas they seem to diﬀer during the first three
years of the term. Second, most previous empirical studies diﬀer from this one in the
sense that they compare multiple democratic countries with diﬀerent kind of electoral
systems. This study compares diﬀerent units within the same electoral system and with
the same institutional background. Third, similar regression discontinuity approach has
not been used previously to analyze this question. I develop a new and very simple
way to compute the running variable. And last, there are no studies on the topic using
Finnish data.
Considering the important economic role of municipalities and the commonness of
single-party control in Finland, this study seems to be answering a weighty question.
However, there are yet many intriguing questions related to single-party control that
remain unanswered. For example, Moisio (2002) points out that the seat share of the
largest party does not explain variation in municipal expenditures very well, though
there are small diﬀerences. Given this consensus on economic matters, it is expectable
that there are no major changes in policies, even if the seat shares change. This is also
a often heard argument in popular discussions. Still, it has not yet been confirmed
in academic studies, if there are changes in economic policies after the largest party
loses or gains an absolute majority. This is the second question that remains without
answer. This sort of changes happen, though they are not extremely common. In all
elections between years 1976 and 2012, the largest party lost its majority position in
171 elections and gained one in 196 elections out of 4,410 votings.
Folke (2011) and Freier and Odendahl (2012b) study causal eﬀects of party representa-
tion in Swedish and German municipalities, which have proportional elections. Single-
party control is not unexistent in Swedish and German municipalities, but neither Folke
nor Freier and Odendahl investigate the party eﬀects of smaller parties, when one party
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has gained over half of the seats. A common argument in popular discussions is that
when one party has total control over decision making, the other parties do not matter.
This is also a topic that could be studied.
Some of political economy literature studies incumbency advantages in elections. Lee
(2007) develops a regression discontinuity design to test, whether the incumbent party
have had better advantage from the incumbency in the U.S. House of Representatives
elections. He finds that the estimates of the incumbency advantage are usually of the
order of ten percent of all votes in the coming election. Liang (2011, forthcoming) uses
similar approach with data from Swedish municipalities, which have a proportional
system. He refers the eﬀect of a party holding a seat as the “incumbency eﬀect” and
a coalition holding an absolute majority as the “ruling eﬀect”. It would be interesting
to see, if there is ruling eﬀect for the parties that hold alone over half of the seats in
Finnish local councils.
Last, I discuss briefly one question, namely are single-party governed municipalities
disappearing from the Finnish map? Figure 7 characterizes the development of the
amount of single-party governed municipalities. The election data reveals that the
number and share of single-party governed municipalities has remained rather stable
between years from 1976 to 1992, but it increased in 1996 and 2000 elections. The
trend turned downwards again in 2004 elections. It could be that voters’ preferences
have changed along the time, or that the on-going wave of municipal mergers has af-
fected the number of single-party governments. The latter is partly due to the reducing
number of municipalities, as the merged municipalities are mainly smaller ones where
single-party governments are common. On the other hand, party structures tend to be
more fragmented in larger municipalities. The central government is currently prepar-
ing municipal reform, which would basically lead to mergers especially between smaller
municipalities. Time will tell, will the declining trend of the number of single-party
governed municipalities continue and will municipal reform have an eﬀect, if it is car-
ried out.
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Figure 8: Number and Share of Single-party and Coalition Governed
Municipalities.
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Year
1st 2nd 3rd 4th Avg
Total expenditures (per capita)
221.33*** 264.64*** 242.24*** 233.79*** 228.64***
(62.09) (64.07) (63.15) (65.16) (62.90)
Social and health care expenditures
197.63*** 212.45*** 247.81*** 270.64*** 236.92***
(32.08) (32.59) (28.34) (30.86) (28.30)
Education expenditures
47.49* 47.78* 42.76 50.13* 45.76*
(25.31) (25.32) (26.37) (26.52) (26.15)
Personnel expenditures
209.96*** 220.71 239.98*** 231.98*** 232.91***
(40.70) (41.14) (42.29) (42.28) (41.78)
Investments
-30.28** -23.80 -19.26 -27.67* -21.19
(14.89) (16.55) (16.81) (15.16) (13.97)
Total revenues
272.85*** 304.72*** 283.06*** 290.79*** 277.22***
(59.43) (62.05) (58.94) (61.44) (58.80)
Total tax revenues
-252.66*** -260.16*** -239.67*** -231.21*** -240.94***
(31.47) (32.53) (31.56) (32.06) (31.63)
Income tax revenues
-272.06*** -288.64*** -261.49*** -253.35*** -264.97***
(25.56) (27.28) (26.62) (26.84) (26.26)
Property tax revenues
-6.03 -7.83 0.71 1.78 0.36
(8.17) (8.74) (8.66) (8.86) (8.50)
Total debt
-14.76 -7.59 40.63 85.41 43.66
(62.16) (63.72) (62.93) (65.80) (61.88)
Deficit (accounting year)
-7.10 0.66 25.44** -19.98 0.10
(9.40) (8.35) (10.70) (12.33) (6.64)
Notes: Standard errors clustered at municipality level are reported in parentheses. Number of observations in each case
except for property taxes and total debt: 3, 347 (1st year), 3, 340 (2nd year), 2, 995 (3rd year), 3, 422 (4th year), 2, 991
(averages). Number of observations for property taxes and total debt: N = 1, 693. Significance levels: * 10 %, ** 5 %
and *** 1 %.
Table A.2: OLS Estimates.
Year of term
Variable First Second Third Fourth Average
Total expenditures 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12
Social and health care expenditures 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.24
Education expenditures 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18
Personnel expenditures 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.14
Investments 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.13
Total revenues 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.18
Total tax revenues 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.19
Income tax revenues 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.20
Property tax revenues 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.16
Total debt 0.24 0.22 0.39 0.33 0.52
Deficit (accounting year) 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.32 0.22
Notes: This table reports optimal bandwidths for regressions in Section 7.2 using local linear
regression with triangular kernel. Optimal bandwidths are computed using Imbens and
Kalyaranaman’s (2012) method.
Table A.3: Optimal Bandwidth Choices for Expenditures and Revenues.
Variable
Year Total expenditures Total revenues
1st
-266.56* -123.23* -263.22* -115.04
(140.83) (73.75) (155.99) (74.23)
2nd
-250.64* -79.47 -215.42 -93.90
(149.71) (77.00) (164.17) (77.95)
3rd
-117.70 -67.05 -146.28 -126.50*
(129.21) (66.03) (148.00) (61.15)
4th
39.06 -29.47 40.75 -67.48
(135.11) (65.03) (149.77) (65.12)
Avg
-175.16 -102.42* -160.17 -80.13
(126.23) (49.73) (141.75) (53.66)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Each specification uses fourth order control polynomial of
the running variable. The order of the polynomial has been
chosen according to AIC. The set of control variables includes
total population, lagged value (Yt 4) of the outcome variable
and year dummies. Standard errors clustered at municipality
level are reported in parentheses. Number of observations in
each case: 3, 347 (1st year), 3, 340 (2nd year), 2, 995 (3rd year),
3, 422 (4th year), 2, 991 (averages). Significance levels: * 10 %,
** 5 % and *** 1 %.
Table A.4: Parametric RDD Results for Total Expenditures and
Revenues.
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Figure A.1: Probability of Treatment.
